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STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RIGHTS: HOW
MUCH SHOULD THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
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Kendra Kumor*
This Note is about state court interpretation of state constitutional
provisions that relate to prosecutorial summation arguments. This Note
finds that when the U.S. Supreme Court rules on a prosecutorial summation
issue, state court interpretations of their state constitutional provisions are
less diverse than when the Supreme Court does not issue an opinion. When
state courts interpret their own constitutional provisions after Supreme
Court precedent has been disseminated, they give more interpretative weight
to the Supreme Court opinion than any other sister state precedent. This
Note uses prosecutorial summation arguments to illustrate why state courts
should refrain from placing greater interpretive weight on Supreme Court
precedent when interpreting their state constitutions, since state courts have
more expertise and authority in the area of state criminal trial procedure.
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INTRODUCTION
State court criminal defendants derive their rights from both the U.S.
Constitution and the constitutions of their states.1 Sometimes the language
of the federal and state constitutions is identical, and other times the language
differs significantly.2 In either case, the rights that defendants derive from
1. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84
VA. L. REV. 389, 392 (1998).
2. For example, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads, in part: “No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The counterpart in the Maryland Declaration of Rights, at article 24, reads: “That
no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property,
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these two constitutional sources are usually the same, despite differing
language or differing drafter intentions.3 Yet, the American judiciary has
explicitly rejected the idea of state constitutional universalism,4 and the
balance between the federal judiciary and state judiciary is still biased toward
the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court.5
Before the Supreme Court’s selective incorporation6 of the federal Bill of
Rights against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the only
individual rights at the state level were derived from state constitutions.7 The
movement known as “New Judicial Federalism” is thus viewed as a
rediscovery of these state constitutional rights beginning in the 1970s after
most of the Bill of Rights had been incorporated.8 Although New Judicial
Federalism sought to shift the focus of individual rights back to the state
constitutions as alternative or additional sources of individual rights, “state
courts generally do not blaze their own trails but instead follow the federal
lead.”9 This federal bias is illustrated by the fact that when the Supreme
Court rules on an issue, most state courts conform to this precedent when
interpreting state constitutions, but when the Supreme Court does not rule on
an issue, state courts vary much more when interpreting state constitutions.10
Although this pattern is evident in the state courts’ holdings, the opinions
do not explicitly acknowledge or explain why state courts appear to be
compelled to follow federal precedent when interpreting their own
constitutions.11 Regardless of the reasons state courts may feel compelled to
follow the holdings of the Supreme Court, there are several federalist
considerations and values that demand state courts give the Supreme Court
no more persuasive weight than the reasoning of their sister state courts.
Prosecutorial summation issues involve various rights of defendants and
duties of prosecutors as state actors. These issues are particularly murky, as
but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS art. XXIV.
3. See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 390–91.
4. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833); see also JAMES
A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A
FEDERAL SYSTEM 30–31 (2005) (defining constitutional universalism as “the belief that all
American constitutions are drawn from the same set of universal principles of constitutional
self-governance”).
5. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal
Judge’s Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & SOC. ORD.
557, 557–58.
6. Since the U.S. Bill of Rights was only originally intended to protect the enumerated
rights from federal government interference, the Supreme Court, over several decades,
“selectively incorporated” certain rights to be protected from state government interference as
well. THOMAS C. MARKS JR. & JOHN F. COOPER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL
34–35 (2d ed. 2003).
7. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 113 (2009).
8. Id. at 113–14.
9. Schapiro, supra note 1, at 390–91.
10. See infra Part I.A; see also JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES
AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 174–75 (2018) (describing the pattern
of state court “lockstepping” with federal precedent).
11. See infra Part I.B; see also GARDNER, supra note 4, at 12.
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they often involve balancing the rights of the accused with the duties of the
state.12 This Note focuses on the constitutional issues surrounding
prosecutorial summation arguments in particular because of their potential to
elicit a range of judicial considerations at the federal, state, and local levels.
An analysis of a different area of criminal trial procedure could produce
different judicial patterns and conclusions.
Part I of this Note will illustrate that, since the Supreme Court rarely opines
on prosecutorial summation issues, significant variation in state court
interpretations of their constitutional provisions is the norm, but when the
Supreme Court does rule on a prosecutorial summation issue, such as in
Portuondo v. Agard13 and United States v. Robinson,14 state courts conform
to those rulings without individual analysis of the states’ constitutional
language. Part II explores the competing considerations underlying why
state court judges may feel compelled to conform to or diverge from Supreme
Court precedent. Finally, Part III will argue that, although state courts may
conform to federal precedent for valid reasons, there are several overriding
reasons why they should refrain from overemphasizing Supreme Court
precedent, especially in the context of prosecutorial summation issues.
I. STATE COURT BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO U.S. SUPREME COURT
RULINGS ON PROSECUTORIAL SUMMATION ISSUES
Two general patterns emerge when analyzing the relationship between
federal and state court precedent. First, if the Supreme Court does not
promulgate a ruling, state court interpretations are varied.15 Second, when
the Supreme Court does promulgate a ruling, state courts often conform to
that precedent.16 This part uses specific prosecutorial summation issues and
cases to illustrate these two patterns of state court behavior.
A. No Supreme Court Ruling: State Court Variation as the Norm
The Supreme Court receives between 7000 and 8000 petitions for
certiorari each term.17 The Court only grants review with oral arguments by
attorneys in about eighty of these cases.18 Of these cases,19 only a fraction
12. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506–07 (1983) (stating the Court’s
analysis of prosecutorial conduct must “balanc[e] the interests involved”).
13. 529 U.S. 61 (2000) (holding that when a defendant takes the stand, a prosecutor may
always discredit the defendant on summation by arguing the defendant tailored testimony to
the evidence presented at trial).
14. 485 U.S. 25 (1988) (holding that a prosecutor’s summation comments that the
defendant could have taken the stand and explained his side of the story did not violate his
Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination, since the remarks fairly
responded to defense counsel’s summation).
15. Infra Part I.A.
16. Infra Part I.B.
17. The Supreme Court at Work: The Term and Caseload, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/courtatwork.aspx [https://perma.cc/5LVF-M2TR] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2020).
18. Id.
19. See id.
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deal with state criminal trial procedure and an even smaller fraction deal with
prosecutorial summation rules in particular.20 Thus, of the vast majority of
prosecutorial summation issues that may arise, the Supreme Court has
directly addressed only a handful. This section provides examples of state
court behavior when, as is the norm, the Supreme Court does not rule on a
particular prosecutorial summation issue. The examples show that state court
variation on prosecutorial summation issues is typical state court behavior.
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of a prosecutor’s
use of a personal opinion about the defendant’s guilt in summation
arguments.21 Thus, states vary in their rules on the use of personal opinion
as to defendants’ guilt in prosecutorial summation speeches.22 Nineteen
states find that any use of personal opinion in summation arguments is
improper.23 Twenty-eight states find that use of a prosecutor’s personal
opinion regarding a defendant’s guilt in summation arguments is proper only
if it is supported by the evidence.24 Four other states still have unsettled law
on this issue.25
When state courts do not have Supreme Court precedent to use as
guidance, they look to other sources of legal authority, such as sister state
courts or American Bar Association (ABA) rules and guidelines. For
example, the Supreme Court of Alabama used language from the New York
and Michigan courts to justify its ruling that it is never proper for prosecutors
to state their personal beliefs as to the guilt of the accused in argument.26 The
Alabama Supreme Court further bolstered this reasoning by using Canons
Five and Fifteen of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.27 The North
Dakota Supreme Court also cites to dozens of state court cases in coming to
the conclusion that prosecutorial summation remarks regarding the
20. For example, in the 2018 term, the Supreme Court considered seventy-two cases and
only four of those cases concerned state criminal trial procedure. See SCOTUS Statistics,
HARV. L. REV., https://harvardlawreview.org/supreme-court-statistics [https://perma.cc/
Z5CF-UWP7] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
21. In United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1985), the Court touched on this issue but
limited its ruling to whether or not the prosecutor’s personal opinion of the defendant’s guilt
amounted to plain error, not whether the prosecutor’s comments were inappropriate as the
lower courts had previously determined.
22. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Prosecutor’s
Argument to Jury Indicating His Belief or Knowledge as to Guilt of Accused—Modern State
Cases, 88 A.L.R.3d 449 (1978).
23. See id. Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id.
24. See id. Those states are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
25. See id. Those states are Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and Vermont. Id.
26. Adams v. State, 198 So. 2d 255, 257 (Ala. 1967).
27. Id. Canon Five of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics states, “The primary duty
of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done.”
CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908). Canon Fifteen states, “It is
improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his client’s innocence or in
the justice of his cause.” Id. Canon 15.
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prosecutor’s personal opinion are impermissible unless evidence supports the
opinion.28 The North Dakota Supreme Court also uses the ABA Canons and
a treatise on criminal procedure to justify its position.29 The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals also weighed various sister state court rulings
extensively when considering its formulation of a rule on prosecutorial use
of personal opinion in summation remarks.30 After describing in detail no
less than nine other state court holdings, the Oklahoma court concluded,
“[w]e could fill a volume of quotations to the same effect from both
American and English reports, but deem these sufficient” to support the
ruling that prosecutors may not use personal opinion in summation
arguments unless the evidence supports such an opinion.31
On the other hand, some courts solely rely on their own authority in
promulgating rules on prosecutorial summation issues. For example, the
Minnesota Supreme Court did not cite a single authority in holding that a
prosecutor is “never justified in thrusting his personality into the case, and
expressing his opinion that the defendant is guilty.”32 The Arizona Supreme
Court cited only itself in cases with parallel, yet not controlling, facts dealing
with prosecutorial summations before concluding, “[i]n our state the
prosecuting attorney should not in his argument . . . submit his personal
opinion.”33
State courts do not give much weight to lower federal courts’ rulings on
this prosecutorial summation issue. Even though nearly every circuit court
has ruled on this issue, the state courts in each circuit are still split on when
allowing personal opinions in prosecutorial summation arguments is
improper.34 For example, the Second Circuit is comprised of Vermont, New
York, and Connecticut.35 In United States v. Carr,36 the Second Circuit held
that a prosecutor’s personal views are altogether prohibited in summation
arguments.37 Yet, Vermont’s case law on this issue is still unsettled,38 while

28. State v. Gunderson, 144 N.W. 659, 660 (N.D. 1913) (holding the following
prosecutorial remarks were impermissible statements of personal opinion: “I do not come
here to try a case unless the defendant is guilty”).
29. Id.
30. Williams v. State, 114 P. 1114, 1119–22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1910).
31. Id. at 1122.
32. State v. Clark, 131 N.W. 369, 370 (Minn. 1911).
33. State v. Titus, 152 P.2d 129, 131 (Ariz. 1944).
34. See generally United States v. Miller, 799 F.3d 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2015); United States
v. Thompson, 482 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2005);
United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d
1076 (9th Cir. 2002); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Renfro, 600 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1979).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 41.
36. 424 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2005).
37. Id. at 227.
38. See State v. Parker, 162 A. 696, 699 (Vt. 1932) (citing with approval cases that express
the view that prosecutors’ personal opinions are always prohibited and also cases that express
the view that prosecutors’ personal opinions are permitted if based on the evidence presented
at trial).
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New York39 and Connecticut40 follow this ruling. Additionally, the Fifth
Circuit is comprised of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi;41 Texas42 and
Louisiana43 case law is still unsettled on this issue, even though the Fifth
Circuit has ruled that prosecutors may not express their personal opinions
unless their opinions are based on the evidence.44 Mississippi follows the
Fifth Circuit’s logic.45 Although the above analysis encompasses only one
prosecutorial summation issue, it is generally illustrative of state court
behavior when the Supreme Court has not promulgated a ruling.46
B. Supreme Court Ruling: More Uniform State Court Opinions
Although it is relatively uncommon, the Supreme Court has opined on
several prosecutorial summation issues.47 When the Supreme Court does
promulgate a ruling, the state courts behave differently than when no
Supreme Court precedent exists. This section demonstrates that when the
Supreme Court does rule on a prosecutorial summation issue, the state courts
often conform to the federal precedent. Through two Supreme Court cases
and corresponding state court opinions, this section illustrates the powerful
influence federal precedent has on shaping state court constitutional
interpretations regarding prosecutorial summation issues.

39. People v. Lovello, 136 N.E.2d 483, 484 (N.Y. 1956).
40. Jenkins v. Comm’r of Corr., 726 A.2d 657, 665 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 41.
42. Compare Clayton v. State, 502 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (holding a
prosecutor’s argument that he was not paid enough to prosecute defendants whom he did not
know to be guilty was improper), with Shipp v. State, 482 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972) (holding a prosecutor’s argument that “[i]t has been my experience that the stronger the
State’s case is we bring you, the more desperate and more ridiculous the defenses are,” was a
permissible comment).
43. Compare State v. Landry, 262 So. 2d 360, 362 (La. 1972) (holding the prosecutor’s
personal interpretation of the facts was permissible because his comments did not imply
personal knowledge of the facts), with State v. Kaufman, 304 So. 2d 300, 307 (La. 1974)
(holding the prosecutor’s personal opinion is only permitted in summation if it is clear to the
jury his opinion is solely based on the evidence presented at trial).
44. United States v. Thompson, 482 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2007).
45. Long v. State, 141 So. 591, 594 (Miss. 1932).
46. See J. Evans, Annotation, Comment or Argument by Court or Counsel that
Prosecution Evidence Is Uncontradicted as Amounting to Improper Reference to Accused’s
Failure to Testify, 14 A.L.R.3d 723 (1967) (detailing varied state rulings in criminal cases
where prosecutors comment that their evidence is uncontradicted); William B. Johnson,
Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Comments by Counsel Vouching for
Credibility of Witness—State Cases, 45 A.L.R.4th 602 (1986) (detailing varied state rulings
in criminal cases where prosecutors comment on the credibility of law enforcement officials
as witnesses).
47. See generally United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding prosecutor’s
remarks regarding his personal opinion of defendant’s guilt did not amount to plain error);
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (holding that when a court considers if a
prosecutor’s reference to the defendants’ failure to testify requires reversal, the court must
consider if it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty
verdict); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (holding a prosecutor’s ambiguous
remark about the defendant’s guilt was improper but mitigated by a curative instruction).
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1. Portuondo v. Agard
The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors may always argue defendants
tailored their testimony to the evidence presented at trial, no matter how little
evidence prosecutors may have to support this argument.48 After the
Supreme Court so held, most state courts interpreted state constitutional
provisions in line with this ruling.49 Only five states have interpreted their
state constitutions differently than the Supreme Court interpreted the U.S.
Constitution in this case.50 Four of those states followed the dissenting
opinion of the case,51 and only one state promulgated a holding that no
Supreme Court Justice stated.52
In 2000, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision in Agard.53 The
Court granted certiorari after the Second Circuit held that a prosecutor’s
summation remarks violated the respondent’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.54 At trial, the prosecutor said, “You know, ladies and
gentlemen, unlike all the other witnesses in this case the defendant has a
benefit and the benefit that he has, unlike all the other witnesses, is he gets to
sit here and listen to the testimony of all the other witnesses before he
testifies.”55
Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia reasoned that the
prosecutor’s comments concerned the respondent’s credibility as a witness
and were therefore in line with the long-standing doctrine that when a
defendant voluntarily assumes the role of a witness, the defendant’s
credibility may be impeached.56 Justice Scalia rejected the argument that the
comments’ generic nature made them unconstitutional.57 The majority
reasoned that the comments “simply set forth a consideration the jury was to
have in mind when assessing the defendant’s credibility,” which prior case
law supported.58
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the concurring opinion, in which he
agreed the prosecutor’s summation likely did not meet the high threshold of
a serious trial error but nonetheless stated that comments of that type “should
be discouraged rather than validated.”59 Justice Stevens explicitly noted that
state courts and trial judges have the power to create their own rules about
this type of comment in prosecutorial summation speeches, despite the
Court’s ruling in this case.60
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 69 (2000).
See infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 63–70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 71–89 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
529 U.S. 61 (2000).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 69 (citing Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958)).
Id. at 70–71.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.
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Writing for the dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg voiced strong
opposition to the majority’s ruling: “The Court today transforms a
defendant’s presence at trial from a Sixth Amendment right into an automatic
burden on his credibility.”61 The dissent agreed with the Second Circuit’s
prohibition on generic tailoring accusations and allowance of specific
arguments about the fit between the defendant’s testimony and other
witnesses’ testimony.62
Despite Justice Stevens’s call for state courts to independently interpret
prosecutorial summation speech rules (especially regarding a prosecutor’s
emphasis on a defendant’s presence at trial),63 only five states have expanded
on this federal precedent, and only one has used its state constitution to do
The five states are Colorado,65 Hawaii,66 Massachusetts,67
so.64
Minnesota,68 and New Jersey,69 with Hawaii being the only state to rely on
its state constitution.70 All other states with opinions on this issue have
conformed to the Supreme Court’s holding.
Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Minnesota have all held that
prosecutors’ generic tailoring arguments on summation are prohibited, but
prosecutors’ specific tailoring arguments on summation are permitted.71
These states all conform to the reasoning provided in Justice Ginsburg’s
dissenting opinion in Agard.72 In State v. Mattson,73 the Supreme Court of
the State of Hawaii explicitly stated it was “persuaded by the reasoning of
the Portuondo dissent.”74 The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the
confrontation clause in article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution is
broader than the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.75
Hawaii’s confrontation clause prohibits generic tailoring arguments because
they “burden the defendant’s constitutional right to be present at trial” and
“discourage a defendant from exercising his constitutional right to testify on
his own behalf.”76
The Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Colorado courts followed the holding
of the Agard dissent but held as such using their supervisory authority instead
of their state constitutional interpretation authority.77 In Commonwealth v.
61. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 88.
63. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring).
64. State v. Mattson, 226 P.3d 482 (Haw. 2010).
65. People v. Martinez, 224 P.3d 1026 (Colo. App. 2009).
66. Mattson, 226 P.3d 482.
67. Commonwealth v. Gaudette, 808 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. 2004).
68. State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 2006).
69. State v. Daniels, 861 A.2d 808 (N.J. 2004).
70. Mattson, 226 P.3d at 496.
71. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
72. See People v. Martinez, 224 P.3d 1026, 1037 (Colo. App. 2009); Mattson, 226 P.3d
at 496; Gaudette, 808 N.E.2d at 802; Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 657–58.
73. 226 P.3d 482 (Haw. 2010).
74. Id. at 496.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing state courts’ inherent supervisory power).
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Gaudette,78 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared that it is
impermissible for a prosecutor to make tailoring arguments on summation,
“unless there is evidence introduced at trial to support that argument.”79
However, the Massachusetts Supreme Court did not make this ruling based
on state constitutional language.80 It promulgated this holding based on prior
case law, predating the Supreme Court’s ruling in Agard, which held this
type of summation argument was prejudicial, and the court explicitly
declined to consider any state constitutional violation argument.81
In State v. Swanson,82 the Minnesota Supreme Court, noting Justice
Stevens’s concurrence encouraging state courts to consider the question
independently as a matter of state law,83 echoed the Massachusetts court’s
approach.84 It held that “although not constitutionally required, the better
rule” is prohibiting generic tailoring and allowing specific tailoring in
prosecutorial summation arguments.85
In People v. Martinez,86 the Colorado Court of Appeals explicitly agreed
with Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in Agard and opined that generic
tailoring arguments defeat the truth-seeking function of the trial process and
ignore the constitutional presumption of innocence.87 The court concluded
that the defendant “ha[d] not given [it] a persuasive reason for concluding
the Colorado Constitution offers protection to a defendant . . . independent
of and supplemental to the protections provided by the United States
Constitution.”88 Nevertheless, the court held that “pursuant to [its]
supervisory authority,” generic tailoring arguments on summation are
prohibited, while specific tailoring arguments are permitted.89
New Jersey is the only state that did not completely conform to Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent in Agard. It expanded the dissent’s logic, holding that
generic tailoring arguments during summation are always prohibited and
specific tailoring arguments are permitted “but in a limited fashion.”90 Like
the state courts mentioned above, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found
that specific tailoring arguments must be based on the evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom but under no circumstances can the
prosecutor explicitly refer to the defendant’s presence at court or ability to
hear other witnesses’ testimony.91 The New Jersey court also based its

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

808 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. 2004).
Id. at 802.
Id.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Person, 508 N.E.2d 88, 90–91 (Mass. 1987)).
707 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 2006).
Id. at 657.
Id. at 658 n.2 (citing Gaudette, 808 N.E.2d at 801–03).
Id. at 657–58.
224 P.3d 1026 (Colo. App. 2009).
Id. at 1036.
Id. at 1035–36.
Id. at 1036.
State v. Daniels, 861 A.2d 808, 819 (N.J. 2004).
Id.
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holding on its supervisory authority, instead of its state constitutional
interpretation authority.92
As for the vast majority of states that followed the Supreme Court’s Agard
ruling, the state courts’ language shows there is a perceived higher persuasive
bar to convince state courts to interpret state constitutions and rules
differently than the Supreme Court interprets the U.S. Constitution.93 Even
where the state constitutional language is different from the federal
constitutional language, state courts still construe the state constitutional
provision at issue to be identical to the relevant federal provision, using
federal precedent to support the analysis.94
For example, in People v. Swift,95 the New York Court of Appeals
disposed of a defendant’s claim in one dismissive sentence, concluding
“there is no basis upon which to reach a different result as a matter of State
constitutional law.”96 The court made no mention of the differences between
the federal constitutional language on which Agard was based and the New
York state constitutional language that would have been at issue there.97
In State v. Bauer,98 the Iowa Court of Appeals used similar conclusory
language to dispose of a defendant’s claims. “[W]e see no reason to deviate
from the persuasive reasoning and holding of the Court in Portuondo on this
issue, which is in accord with Iowa law and has been previously relied on by
this court.”99 The court did not provide any further justification for its refusal
to analyze the language of the Iowa Constitution with respect to this claim.100
In addressing its decision to refrain from using its supervisory authority in
this instance, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated, “this court’s
supervisory authority is to be ‘sparingly exercised’ . . . and we have been
given no sound reason to exercise it in this context.”101 These dismissive
statements fill state court decisions, “suggesting that state courts . . . have
little interest in engaging in intensive and independent interpretation of their

92. Id.
93. See infra notes 95–102 and accompanying text.
94. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 6–8.
95. 708 N.Y.S.2d 611 (App. Div. 2000).
96. Id. at 611.
97. Section 6 of the New York Bill of Rights provides, in part: “In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel
as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be
confronted with the witnesses against him or her.” N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
98. No. 16-0265, 2017 WL 3067346 (Iowa Ct. App. July 19, 2017).
99. Id. at *4.
100. See id. The Iowa Constitution pertaining to the rights of the accused also differs from
the language of the U.S. Constitution:
In all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the life, or liberty of an
individual the accused shall have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury; to be informed of the accusation against him, to have a copy of the same when
demanded; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for his witnesses; and, to have the assistance of counsel.
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 10.
101. Teoume-Lessane v. United States, 931 A.2d 478, 495 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Watkins
v. United States, 846 A.2d 293, 300 (D.C. 2004)).
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state constitutions,” when Supreme Court precedent has been promulgated
on this prosecutorial summation issue.102
2. United States v. Robinson
The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors may explicitly a reference
defendant’s failure to take the stand if the comments are in fair response to
defense counsel’s remarks.103 After the Supreme Court created this narrow
exception to the Fifth Amendment, most state courts interpreted their Fifth
Amendment counterparts in the same way.104 Only three states have
modified their respective constitutional interpretations from this federal
precedent.105
In 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated its ruling in Robinson, holding
that no Fifth Amendment violation occurred when a prosecutor, in closing
arguments, commented on the defendant’s choice not to testify at trial, where
the comments responded to the defense counsel’s closing remarks.106 The
Sixth Circuit was reversed, having held that the prosecutor’s comments
deprived the defendant of a fair trial because the reference to the defendant’s
failure to testify was “direct,” so it did not matter that the prosecutor’s
remarks were responding to defense counsel’s remarks.107 This Supreme
Court ruling effectively created a general exception to the blanket
constitutional prohibition on using a defendant’s silence against him.108
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned that,
because the prosecutor’s comments referred only to the “possibility of
testifying as one of several opportunities which the defendant was
afforded . . . to explain his side of the case” and the prosecutor’s comments
did not suggest to the jury that the defendant’s silence was substantive
evidence of guilt, no Fifth Amendment right against compulsory selfincrimination was violated.109 The Court explicitly rejected the Sixth
Circuit’s method of examining whether the comment was a direct or indirect
reference to the defendant’s failure to testify.110 The Fifth Amendment
cannot be used as “a sword that cuts back on the area of legitimate comment
by the prosecutor on the weaknesses in the defense case.”111 When a
prosecutor’s remarks are a fair response to defense counsel’s claim, reference
to the defendant’s silence is constitutional.112

102. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 12.
103. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 25 (1988).
104. See infra notes 128–34 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 117–23 and accompanying text.
106. Robinson, 485 U.S. at 25.
107. Id. at 29.
108. See id. at 31.
109. Id. at 32.
110. Id. at 31–32.
111. Id. at 32 (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 515 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
112. Id.
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Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing the dissenting opinion, reasoned that
although the majority only carved out a small exception to the bright-line rule
that prosecutors may not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, this
modification is nonetheless “unsettling and unwarranted.”113 In his view, the
exception goes against the plain language of the constitutional standard.114
Justice Marshall argues that the majority’s language, providing that a
prosecutor may respond “fairly” to a claim made by defendant’s counsel, is
problematic because a “fair response” could still be exactly the kind of
comment the Fifth Amendment was adopted to prevent.115 According to
Justice Marshall, the Court should have rejected these comments for
violating the Fifth Amendment.116
Only a handful of states have distinguished their state constitutions from
this federal precedent when interpreting their state constitutions’ Fifth
Amendment rights. In Adams v. State,117 the Alaska Supreme Court placed
a higher bar on what warrants a “fair response” from the prosecutor when
calling attention to a defendant’s silence.118 The court denied the prosecutor
protection under the fair response doctrine articulated in Robinson for two
reasons: (1) because the defense counsel did not expressly claim that the
government denied the defendant the ability to tell his side of the story and
(2) because the prosecutor did not expressly state he was responding to
defense counsel’s express claims of the defendant’s inability to tell his side
of the story.119
The Alaska Supreme Court articulated that the fair response doctrine only
affords prosecutors protection if the defense counsel and prosecutor are
explicitly responding to one another’s remarks.120 Robinson did not require
such an explicit indication of a response to defense counsel’s statements;
thus, Alaska created a higher bar for a prosecutor to be granted protection for
improper remarks under the fair response doctrine.
A California appellate court has similarly elevated the fair response
standard by requiring that the prosecutor’s comment be a “direct and fair
response.”121 In State v. Ellsworth,122 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
also held that, for a prosecutor to invoke the fair response doctrine when
referencing a defendant’s failure to testify, defense counsel must have
explicitly or implicitly referenced the defendant’s failure to testify.123 These
state courts do not simply require a fair response as articulated in Robinson
113. Id. at 38 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 39.
115. Id. at 40.
116. Id. at 45.
117. 261 P.3d 758 (Alaska 2011).
118. See id. at 769.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 769–70.
121. People v. Diaz, 255 Cal. Rptr. 91, 97 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating, in a denial for a petition
for rehearing, that the prosecutor’s comment must be a “direct and fair response” in order for
a prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s silence to be excused).
122. 855 A.2d 474 (N.H. 2004).
123. See id. at 479.
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but a direct and fair response for a prosecutor to successfully invoke this
doctrine.
Maryland explicitly declined to consider whether the fair response doctrine
applies to a prosecutor’s comments on a defendant’s failure to testify.124
Therefore, it has not yet decided if it will follow the Robinson Court’s ruling
that a response need simply be “fair” to comment on a defendant’s silence or
create a more exacting standard like those of Alaska, California, and New
Hampshire.125 In the same opinion, the Maryland Court of Appeals explicitly
stated that, although article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is in
pari materia126 with the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, it has
been interpreted to confer more comprehensive self-incrimination rights than
those of the federal Fifth Amendment.127 This statement seemingly
references the court’s right to promulgate a more exacting standard than the
U.S. Supreme Court promulgated for the fair response doctrine in Robinson.
All other state courts with opinions on this issue have not departed from
the federal holding, despite such a strong dissenting opinion from Justice
Marshall about the eroding of a bright-line constitutional standard.128 Again,
the state courts’ language shows there is a perceived higher persuasive bar to
convince state courts to interpret their state constitutions and laws differently
than the Supreme Court interprets the U.S. Constitution. For example, in
Moore v. State,129 the Indiana Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that
the Indiana Constitution is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution but nonetheless refused to promulgate a different standard
on state constitutional grounds because the defendant supplied no “cogent
argument” based on the Indiana Constitution.130 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, quoting Robinson extensively, summarily concluded that the
fair response doctrine applied to its Fifth Amendment counterpart without
any further state constitutional analysis.131
In Wright v. State,132 the Mississippi Supreme Court overruled prior
holdings that partially relied on its interpretations of U.S. Supreme Court
precedent to interpret its own state constitution.133 It reasoned that, after the
Robinson Court clarified prior Fifth Amendment doctrine, its prior holdings,
relying on both the Mississippi Constitution and the federal Fifth
Amendment protections, are overruled to the extent that they do not follow
the U.S. Supreme Court’s fair response doctrine articulated in Robinson.134
124. Marshall v. State, 999 A.2d 1029, 1038 (Md. 2010).
125. See supra notes 118–23 and accompanying text.
126. In pari materia means “in the same matter” in Latin. In pari materia, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
127. Marshall, 999 A.2d at 1035.
128. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. 669 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. 1996).
130. Id. at 739 n.14.
131. See Commonwealth v. Trivigno, 750 A.2d 243, 249–50 (Pa. 2000).
132. 958 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 2007).
133. See id. at 164.
134. Id. at 166 (overruling “Livingston and its progeny” since the Livingston court
erroneously interpreted Supreme Court precedent, as clarified by Robinson).
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The above examples demonstrate a state court pattern of seemingly blind
“lockstepping” to Supreme Court precedent when it has promulgated an
opinion on a prosecutorial summation issue.135 The next part contemplates
the potential various state court motivations for this lockstepping, since state
courts rarely provide their reasoning for following U.S. Supreme Court
precedent.
II. STATE COURT MOTIVATIONS TO FOLLOW OR DIVERGE FROM U.S.
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
As the language cited in Part I.B demonstrates, state courts do not
explicitly acknowledge they are treating Supreme Court precedent differently
than state court precedent when interpreting their state constitutions.
However, beginning with the Burger Court retrenchments136 in the 1960s and
1970s and continuing to today, scholars and judges have generated a large
body of literature about whether state courts should continue this seemingly
blind adherence of state precedent to federal precedent.137 Writers have
devoted less attention to explaining why this convergence of state precedent
and federal precedent continues to occur.138 This part outlines the competing
motivations for why state courts may conform to federal precedent or, on the
other hand, why state courts may rely on their own authority in the context
of the American federalist system. This Note suggests state courts’
motivations can be organized into the following four categories: state
constitutional interpretive methods, institutional legitimacy concerns,
perceived Supreme Court expertise, and the promotion of efficiency through
uniformity of federal and state case law.
A. Justifications for State Court Adherence to Federal Precedent
Although state courts do not explicitly state why they choose to conform
to U.S. Supreme Court precedent,139 they must have some motivations for
doing so. This section outlines the likely justifications for state court
conformity to federal precedent, including federally focused constitutional
interpretation methods, the perceived legitimacy garnered from reliance on

135. See SUTTON, supra note 10, at 174.
136. The Burger Court retrenchments are a series of cases promulgated by many Richard
Nixon-appointed judges that resulted in conservative rulings in criminal procedure, equal
protection, and First Amendment cases. See Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Burger Court and
Freedom of Expression, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37, 37 (1976).
137. This body of literature began to expand with the addition of Justice William Brennan’s
1977 article in the Harvard Law Review, titled State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). The article is the ninth most-cited law review
article of all time. Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights:
A Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2017). Justice Stewart Pollock of the New
Jersey Supreme Court called the article “the Magna Carta of state constitutional law.” Stewart
G. Pollock, Address, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983).
138. Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 43 (2006).
139. See supra Part I.B.
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federal precedent, Supreme Court constitutional expertise, and the values of
uniformity and efficiency between federal and state law.
1. Interpretive Methods Amplifying the Influence of Federal Precedent
The first explanation for state court conformity to federal precedent is that
state court judges analyze state constitutions through a variety of interpretive
methods that favor and emphasize federal court reasoning. These
interpretive methods begin with two assumptions: first, that there is a
relationship between the federal and state constitutions and second, that this
relationship involves federal superiority over state precedent. One such state
constitutional interpretive approach is that state court judges perceive state
constitutional language as derivative of the federal constitution, compelling
state judges to look to federal courts for established interpretations.140 This
occurs both where the federal constitutional language is identical to the state
counterparts and, more surprisingly, where the state constitutional language
differs from the federal language.141 Despite the differing state constitutional
text, state courts still rely on U.S. Supreme Court precedent in construing
their own state constitutions.142 By relying on federal precedent, state courts
inherently ignore the intentions of the drafters of the state constitutions and
the historical context in which they were drafted.143
Another interpretive method that illustrates the state court view that the
U.S. Supreme Court is more authoritative is the state courts’ application of
certain criteria to determine if divergence from federal precedent is
warranted.144 For example, the Washington Supreme Court uses a list of
criteria that includes: “(1) the textual language; (2) differences in the texts;
(3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences;
and (6) matters of particular state or local concern” to determine if it should
diverge from federal precedent.145 The Illinois Supreme Court considers
whether the language of its state constitution justifies a departure from
federal precedent.146 The Supreme Court of California states that
“[d]ecisions of the United States Supreme Court . . . are entitled to respectful
consideration . . . and ought to be followed unless persuasive reasons are
presented for taking a different course.”147 The Supreme Courts of New

140. See GARDNER, supra note 4, at 6–7; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 146–50.
141. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 6–8 (providing examples from the Massachusetts and
Virginia state courts).
142. Id. at 8–9.
143. Id. at 9.
144. See Liu, supra note 137, at 1314.
145. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
146. People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 157 (Ill. 1984) (stating that the court will consider
“the language of our constitution, or in the debates and the committee reports of the
constitutional convention” when determining if there is a valid justification to depart from
federal precedent).
147. People v. Teresinski, 640 P.2d 753, 761 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (citations omitted).
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Jersey,148 Connecticut,149 and Pennsylvania150 have similar criteria when
deciding whether or not to diverge from federal precedent. These approaches
all treat federal precedent with a presumptive correctness that dilutes the
validity of original state court reasoning.151
These methods of state constitutional interpretation are amplified because
it is easier for state judges and their law clerks to research and adhere to
federal precedent.152 Law clerks often graduate from elite law schools that
are focused on federal law.153 When state court law clerks have only been
exposed to federal case law, they bring a federal bias to their writing and
research that reinforces a natural tendency toward federal precedent.154
Additionally, there is a dearth of secondary sources about state constitutional
law developments and a plethora of secondary sources on federal
constitutional law.155 This imbalance in research resources continues to
skew state judicial clerks and judges toward federal case law.156
2. State Court Judges Rely on Federal Precedent to Garner Legitimacy
A second explanation for state court conformity to federal precedent is that
state court judges are concerned about their perceived legitimacy among the
public.157 Many state court judges are elected or selected to the bench for a
set term,158 unlike the federal judiciary, which is nominated for life.159 There
is evidence that judges and scholars perceive state case law as inferior to
federal case law. The idea of state court inferiority to federal courts has long
been a sentiment in American government and among the American
public.160 In 1988, a national poll found 52 percent of adults did not know
their state had a constitution at all.161 Academic writings and the media
contribute to this image of state courts.162 “A quick glance at legal literature
148. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955–57 (N.J. 1982) (“Sound policy reasons, however,
may justify a departure.”).
149. State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 1232–34 (Conn. 1992) (listing federal precedent as a
tool of analysis in interpreting the state constitution).
150. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991) (explaining that federal
decisions should be given due weight in state constitutional analysis when they are well
reasoned).
151. See Liu, supra note 137, at 1314–15.
152. Charles G. Douglas III, State Judicial Activism—the New Role for State Bills of Rights,
12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1123, 1137 (1978).
153. Id. at 1147.
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Aldisert, supra note 5, at 558 (describing “unfortunate language, disparaging our
state judges”).
158. See MARKS & COOPER, supra note 6, at 180–81.
159. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
160. Aldisert, supra note 5, at 557–58; see also GARDNER, supra note 4, at 24 (stating
“rulings of state supreme courts are generally poorly understood and poorly covered by the
media” and “lawyers . . . have traditionally been extremely reluctant even to raise state
constitutional issues or, upon raising them, to brief them thoroughly”).
161. SUTTON, supra note 10, at 194.
162. Aldisert, supra note 5, at 559.
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suggests there is no important litigation except cases interpreting federal
statutes or the federal constitution.”163 Out of approximately 200 accredited
and unaccredited law schools in the United States, only twenty-eight taught
a state constitutional law course in 2016.164 The media constantly highlights
state court shortcomings, which provides the American public with the
impression that state courts are less legitimate than their federal
counterparts.165
Thus, state court judges seek to derive legitimacy from citing to their
federal counterparts that are more influential in scholarship and in the
media.166 State courts often inject federal authority into their decisions even
though only state law is at issue.167 By injecting federal law into a case, the
state court gives the federal judiciary the potential jurisdiction to decide the
claim, since the state court’s holding is no longer predicated on an “adequate
and independent” state ground.168 State courts and state legislatures are
happy to have federal court precedent resolve controversial policy issues to
avoid making unpopular decisions.169 Some argue that state judges abdicate
their duty to solve these traditionally localized problems in a charged political
climate.170
Ensuring legitimacy by citing federal precedent in state court opinions
dealing with state law may also be spurred by the expansion of the federal
government, national political parties, and national lobbies, which have
created a “homogenizing influence on our political and cultural identity.”171
In today’s society, most people see themselves first as American citizens and
second as citizens of the states in which they reside.172 Indeed, under the
Citizenship Clause in the U.S. Constitution, a person cannot be a citizen of a
state without also being a citizen of the United States.173
These perceptions of federal identity may also make it harder for state
courts to confidently rely on their states’ unique history, values, and character
to justify nonconformity with the U.S. Constitution, especially in situations
where the state and federal constitutional language are exactly the same.174
When judges and citizens cannot distinguish a state’s identity from the

163. Id.
164. SUTTON, supra note 10, at 194–95.
165. Aldisert, supra note 5, at 559.
166. See GARDNER, supra note 4, at 23–24.
167. Douglas, supra note 152, at 1143; see also MARKS & COOPER, supra note 6, at 42.
168. MARKS & COOPER, supra note 6, at 38. The Supreme Court formally stated this
doctrine in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1874). It was later revised in Michigan
v. Long, where the Supreme Court developed the “plain statement rule,” which presumes that
when a state court relies on both federal and state law, the decision is based on federal law
unless the opinion includes a clear statement to the contrary. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1040–41 (1983).
169. Aldisert, supra note 5, at 562.
170. Id.
171. Liu, supra note 137, at 1327.
172. See id.
173. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
174. See Liu, supra note 137, at 1328.
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identity of the country as a whole, they may feel they lack a legitimate basis
on which to diverge from federal interpretations of constitutional language.
The distinctiveness of state history, values, and character has significantly
diminished from the time of the Framers. Understanding states as a unified
community with common values can be seen as “silly” and “pointless,”
because state identity is a thing of the past.175 What used to be fundamental
principles consistent with the origins and evolutions of particular states are
now understood as “transcendent American principles,” and state courts treat
them as such.176
3. State Courts Expect U.S. Supreme Court Justices to Be More
Authoritative on Constitutional Issues
A third explanation for state court conformity to federal precedent is that
state courts may presume the U.S. Supreme Court Justices are more
authoritative on constitutional issues than they are.177 This belief compels
state court judges to view the Supreme Court’s reasoning as presumptively
correct. It is well known that the Supreme Court’s main focus is
The prevalence of constitutional
constitutional jurisprudence.178
interpretation in the Supreme Court’s everyday institutional role may shape
state court judges’ perceptions that the Supreme Court has constitutional
resources and expertise that make it more authoritative on any given
constitutional interpretation issue. State courts’ deferential language when
conforming to Supreme Court precedent illustrates this state court
presumption.179
Moreover, when state courts choose to depart from Supreme Court
precedent, they still illustrate this presumption because state courts have a
tendency to conform to the reasoning of a Supreme Court dissenting opinion
when rejecting the majority opinion.180 For example, after the Supreme
Court ruled that prosecutors may always argue on summation that a
defendant tailored testimony to the evidence presented at trial,181 most state
courts followed this holding.182 However, even the handful of states that did
not adopt this holding simply conformed to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in that
case.183 Of the states that interpreted their state constitutions differently than
the Supreme Court interpreted the U.S. Constitution in Agard, only New

175. Schapiro, supra note 1, at 393.
176. Liu, supra note 137, at 1328.
177. See id. at 1314–15 (explaining that certain interpretive approaches treat federal
precedent as presumptively correct).
178. See Aldisert, supra note 5, at 560.
179. See supra Part I.B.
180. See supra Part I.B.1. A different conclusion may be reached when examining a
different subset of cases than those presented in this Note.
181. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 65 (2000).
182. See supra Part I.B.1.
183. See supra Part I.B.1. Massachusetts, Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, and New Jersey
are the five states that have not conformed to the majority opinion.
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Jersey did not explicitly conform to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.184 The
Hawaii Supreme Court cites Justice Ginsburg’s dissent dozens of times in its
decision regarding this prosecutorial summation issue.185 The Hawaii
Supreme Court praises the dissenting opinion for its apt observations and
explicitly states its agreement with and adoption of the reasoning.186 Thus,
it seems that when the U.S. Supreme Court rules on a prosecutorial
summation issue, the state courts narrow their reasoning to three options: the
Supreme Court’s majority, concurrence, or dissent. This adherence to some
Supreme Court reasoning illustrates the perceived authority of the Supreme
Court Justices’ in the eyes of state court judges.
4. Uniformity Between Federal and State Law Promotes Efficiency
A fourth explanation for state court conformity to federal precedent is that
state court judges value uniformity across state and federal jurisdictions,
especially in the realm of criminal procedure.187 “Vertical uniformity has
been a particular concern in the area of criminal procedure, where courts have
expressed concern about the costs and inefficiencies that disuniformity could
impose on federal and state law enforcement officers.”188 Simplicity and
predictability are often important considerations in the judicial decisionmaking process.189
Courts are worried about creating two sets of rules in criminal procedure,
which could produce confusion among judges, lawyers, and law
enforcement.190 Although state courts explicitly weigh notions of federalism
against uniformity, the value of uniformity appears to be more compelling in
“Divergent interpretations are
the criminal procedure context.191
unsatisfactory . . . particularly where . . . the federal and state provisions are
the same.”192 Additionally, this vertical uniformity has long been considered
a jurisprudential virtue that prevents against forum shopping.193
As a practical matter, it is much easier for state courts to conform to federal
court precedent than for federal courts to conform to various state court
precedents. Once the U.S. Supreme Court promulgates an opinion, all federal

184. In State v. Daniels, the New Jersey Supreme Court cited Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting
opinion but did not follow its central tenant. State v. Daniels, 861 A.2d 808, 820 (N.J. 2004).
Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that prosecutors are never allowed to comment
on a defendant’s presence in the courtroom when making tailoring accusations. Id. at 819.
185. State v. Mattson, 226 P.3d 482, 493–98, 506, 508, 511–13 (Haw. 2010).
186. See id. at 495–96.
187. See Liu, supra note 137, at 1333.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1334.
190. State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 516 (Iowa 2014) (Waterman, J., dissenting); see also
McCrory v. State, 342 So. 2d 897, 900 (Miss. 1977) (en banc); State v. Florance, 527 P.2d
1202, 1209 (Or. 1974) (en banc); State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 536 (Utah 1994) (Stewart,
Associate C.J., concurring).
191. See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (N.J. 1982).
192. Id. (arguing for the application of uniform rules governing search and seizure issues).
193. Liu, supra note 137, at 1334.
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courts across the country must follow this precedent.194 However, when a
state supreme court promulgates an opinion, it is only binding on the lower
courts in its own state.195 Therefore, it is much more convenient for all state
courts to conform to one unified federal precedent than it is for the federal
courts to pick one state holding to adhere to and wait for the U.S. Supreme
Court’s approval. The dual forces of efficiency and uniformity can explain
state courts’ tendencies to conform to federal precedent in the criminal
procedure context.
B. Justifications for State Court Independence from Federal Precedent
Despite the clear patterns of state court behavior illustrated in Part I.B,
there are many reasons why state courts should not readily conform to federal
precedent. Many of these considerations directly undermine the theories and
assumptions underlying the state court motivations outlined in Part II.A.
State court behavior in relation to U.S. Supreme Court precedent would likely
be different if state courts relied on competing considerations, including
state-specific constitutional interpretative methods, legitimacy garnered from
the inherent authority conferred on all state courts, state courts’
overwhelming experience with criminal trial procedure, and the need for
laws tailored to the specific concerns and culture of a jurisdiction.
1. Interpretive Methods Focusing on the State-Specific Context
The first justification for state court independence from federal precedent
is that some state court judges analyze their constitutions using interpretive
methods that emphasize state history and culture. Although some state courts
may see their constitutions as derivatives of the U.S. Constitution, the
language of the U.S. Constitution was at least partially derived from various
state sources.196 The Framers did not develop the concept of a modern,
written constitution; instead, drafters of the former American colonies
developed written constitutions eleven years before the Constitutional
Convention.197 Although this relationship may again suggest convergence,
it could also suggest that the hierarchy should be flipped, in that the U.S.
Supreme Court should be looking to the states as a superior source of
constitutional interpretation, instead of the opposite.198
When the Committee of Detail199 began to write the first draft of the U.S.
Constitution in the summer of 1787, its members gathered materials they
thought may have language from which they could borrow.200 These
194. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
195. See MARKS & COOPER, supra note 6, at 144–48.
196. See GARDNER, supra note 4, at 23.
197. Id.
198. See supra Part II.A.1.
199. This committee consisted of five delegates of geographical diversity, political
experience, drafting ability, and overall prestige, who were voted to this position by the
common consent of the delegates to draft the new constitution of the United States. CLINTON
ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 200–01 (1987).
200. Id. at 201.
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materials included the Articles of Confederation, the Virginia and New
Jersey Plans, and several state constitutions.201 Additionally, when the
federal Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution in 1791, most of its
language was borrowed from existing state constitutions, particularly the
Virginia Declaration of Rights.202
Dating as far back as 1641, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties provided
for due process, jury trials, and double jeopardy protections.203 In 1776, the
Virginia Declaration of Rights provided, “a man hath a right to demand the
cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted by the accusers and
witnesses, to call for evidence in his favour, and to a speedy trial by an
impartial jury.”204 The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
The Constitution of the
incorporates much of this language.205
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, one of the oldest governing constitutions
in the world, established in 1780, provides language similar to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, stating, “[e]ach individual of the society
has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and
property, according to standing laws.”206
Additionally, most state constitutions have either been amended or
completely replaced in recent years, so their texts have different interpretive
historical contexts than the U.S. Constitution, drafted in 1787.207 Given the
ease with which states can amend their constitutions, state constitutional
language is often much longer and broader in scope than the U.S.
Constitution.208 Because different pieces of state constitutional text were
drafted and added in nearly every period of American history, the interpretive
methods relevant to the U.S. Constitution’s historical context have no
applicability to much of the state constitutional language drafted in very
different periods of American history.209
The fact that the federal constitutional language was derived from the
states should reinforce state courts’ influence and authority when interpreting
their own state constitutional language amidst federal precedent. The U.S.
Supreme Court, which has often looked to state court reasoning when
deciding certain criminal procedure issues, reinforces this idea.210

201. Id.
202. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 23.
203. See MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES of 1641, arts. 18, 29, 42.
204. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. VIII (1776).
205. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”).
206. MASS. CONST. art. X; cf. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (stating that neither state nor
federal governments can deprive citizens of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law”).
207. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 26–27.
208. Id. at 27.
209. Id.
210. See Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment
on Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds,
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2. State Courts Derive Legitimacy from Their Inherent Authority
A second justification for state court independence from federal precedent
is that state court authority is derived completely separately from federal
court authority. Not only do state courts have nearly plenary power to
interpret their state constitutions with limited oversight from federal
courts,211 they also have an inherent authority stemming from
subconstitutional common-law doctrine.212 State courts, like their federal
counterparts, have inherent common-law authority to promulgate state rules
of procedure, evidence, and substance.213 The inherent power to enforce
standards of procedure can be used broadly to achieve the interests of
justice.214 State court power is at its peak in state criminal trials.
In Federalist No. 45, James Madison explained that the powers of the
states “extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”215 The state is the
repository of all inherent power and can delegate that power to its various
branches of government.216 Most often, this inherent power to conclusively
interpret a state’s constitution is delegated to the court of last resort.217 This
power is completely separate from the U.S. Constitution’s express grant of
power to the Supreme Court for constitutional interpretation.218 Therefore,
there is no legal need under the American federalist system for state courts
to derive any legitimacy from federal precedent.
However, there are several reasons that many state courts use their inherent
power “sparingly.”219 Instead of making decisions grounded in state
constitutions, inherent power allows courts to make decisions in the “spirit
of the [state’s] Constitution.”220 Therefore, reliance on inherent power often
lacks the same legitimacy when invoked as an explicit justification for
fashioning a judicial rule or remedy.221 Regardless of whether a court
explicitly invokes inherent authority, state courts can impose new rules based

63 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1039–40 (1985); see also William J. Brennan Jr., Some Aspects of
Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 945, 947 (1964).
211. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 10.
212. Bennet L. Gershman, Supervisory Power of the New York Courts, 14 PACE L. REV.
41, 44 (1994).
213. Id. at 57–59. Supervisory power is a variant of this inherent power state courts hold;
however, most references to supervisory power occur at the federal court level. Id. at 42 n.4.
214. See id. at 44.
215. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
216. MARKS & COOPER, supra note 6, at 7.
217. Id. at 143.
218. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
219. Teoume-Lessane v. United States, 931 A.2d 478, 495 (D.C. 2007) (stating “[o]ur
decisions have made plain that this court’s supervisory authority is to be ‘sparingly
exercised’ . . . and we have been given no sound reason to exercise it in this context” (quoting
Watkins v. United States, 846 A.2d 293, 300 (D.C. 2004))).
220. Gershman, supra note 212, at 44 (quoting People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567–
68 (N.Y. 1976)).
221. Id.
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on considerations of justice, fair dealing, and standards of decency.222 These
powers are firmly grounded in state courts’ historic equitable powers and do
not need legal bolstering by federal precedent.223
3. State Court Judges Have More Exposure to Criminal Trials
A third justification for state court independence from federal precedent in
the state criminal procedure context is that state courts oversee the vast
majority of criminal trials. Although some state court judges may perceive
the Supreme Court as having superior knowledge of constitutional issues,224
this is simply not the case regarding criminal trial procedure, including
prosecutorial summation issues. The federal courts only process 3 percent of
all felony prosecutions and under 1 percent of all misdemeanor
prosecutions.225 Since state courts process the vast majority of criminal
trials, they are better positioned to assess issues with the process and the
consequences of those issues. State courts are more exposed to criminal trial
procedure, even though the Supreme Court may be more experienced in
constitutional interpretation.226
Additionally, the Supreme Court has acknowledged state court expertise
in several areas of the law by using state court reasoning to inform its
decisions about federal constitutional interpretation.227 An accumulation of
state court holdings that deviate from federal precedent can spur the Supreme
Court to reconsider that particular issue.228 The Supreme Court has
previously adopted state court analysis in six key areas: judicial review,
substantive due process, freedom of speech and religion, eminent domain,
the right to bear arms, and the rights of the accused.229 With regard to
criminal procedure specifically, the state courts have anticipated and
influenced Supreme Court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution on the
right to counsel, the right to appeal, and the exclusionary rule.230 For
example, in Faretta v. California,231 the Supreme Court justified its holding
that a defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation by citing to
thirty-six state constitutions that explicitly provide for this right.232 The
Supreme Court also reasoned that many state courts had already expressed
222. Id. at 62.
223. See MARKS & COOPER, supra note 6, at 155.
224. See supra Part II.A.3.
225. Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure:
State
Constitutional Law and Selective Disincorporation, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 123–
24 (1996).
226. See Aldisert, supra note 5, at 572.
227. See Utter, supra note 210, at 1030.
228. Liu, supra note 137, at 1332.
229. See Utter, supra note 210, at 1030.
230. See id. at 1039–40; see also Brennan Jr., supra note 210, at 947 (listing his own
experiences on the New Jersey Supreme Court that had an influence on federal case law in the
area of Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and other rights of criminal
suspects).
231. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
232. Id. at 813–14, 813 n.10.
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the view that the U.S. Constitution supports the right to self-representation in
a criminal trial.233 This shows that state courts have the expertise to decide
issues of criminal trial procedure. State courts have made valuable
contributions to federal constitutional law through their independent
interpretations of state constitutions.234
4. The Value of Uniformity Is Outweighed by the Need for State-Specific
Laws
A fourth justification for state court independence from federal precedent
is the need for particularized rules tailored to a jurisdiction’s specific
demands and culture. The interest of federal-state uniformity may be one
consideration in a court’s analysis, but it should not be the deciding factor.235
State courts have a duty to use their authority to oversee and shape state
criminal trial procedures that protect individual rights.236
“[S]tate courts do not have to consider the national implications of their
decisions. They need only reach the best decisions for their own
communities.”237 Although it can be argued the specific cultures of states
have eroded due to the rise of a stronger national government,238 there are
many state-specific considerations that should be contemplated when
interpreting state constitutional language. For example, Alaskan “character”
is based on values of independence, self-reliance, and individualism, and the
framers of Alaska’s constitution likely shared these values.239 Thus, the
Alaskan judiciary has interpreted certain state rights to be broader than their
federal counterparts by emphasizing the value of liberty in Alaskan society
as stronger than the value of liberty in American society generally.240
Another example of prevalent state-specific considerations is Georgia’s
focus on the central role of the family and the promotion of certain
community moral standards through state law.241 These standards are meant
to protect Georgia’s character in the broader American society and stem from
its experience with federal control after the Civil War.242 Finally, Vermont’s
history of pragmatism and republicanism and its heightened deference to
local government may shape the state judiciary’s interpretation of certain
clauses of its constitution.243

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Utter, supra note 210, at 1026.
People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 561 (N.Y. 1986).
See Gershman, supra note 212, at 59 n.123.
Utter, supra note 210, at 1045.
Liu, supra note 137, at 1327.
JAMES T. MCHUGH, EX UNO PLURA: STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THEIR POLITICAL
CULTURES 37 (2003).
240. Id. at 42; see also Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972) (stating that “[t]he
United States of America, and Alaska in particular, reflect a pluralistic society, grounded upon
such basic values as the preservation of maximum individual choice”).
241. MCHUGH, supra note 239, at 106.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 220.
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State courts have a duty to weigh these local needs against the value of
uniformity of state and federal case law. The very purpose of state court
authority and state constitutional history is wasted when state courts blindly
conform to federal precedent, especially in the highly localized area of
criminal trial procedure.
III. STATE COURTS SHOULD NOT OVEREMPHASIZE U.S. SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT REGARDING PROSECUTORIAL SUMMATIONS
Despite the numerous, and often competing, considerations behind state
court adherence to federal precedent illustrated in Part II, state courts should
nevertheless only give U.S. Supreme Court decisions the same persuasive
weight as those of sister state courts, especially in the realm of prosecutorial
summation arguments. Ultimately, “each tribunal is supreme in its own field,
and in the final analysis neither can do the other’s job.”244
State courts should not feel compelled to adhere to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution regarding prosecutorial
summation issues for several reasons. First, state constitutional interpretative
methods based on the presumption of federal superiority are inconsistent with
the federalist structure the Framers intended. Second, state courts should
ground their institutional legitimacy soundly in their own inherent powers
and precedent instead of in Supreme Court precedent. Third, state courts
have more exposure to and experience with criminal trials than federal courts,
thus the perception that the Supreme Court is more authoritative in the realm
of prosecutorial summation arguments is unfounded. Fourth, the values of
uniformity and convergence of state and federal law are outweighed by the
need for state-specific criminal trial procedure that is tailored to the needs of
each jurisdiction for prosecutorial summation issues.
A. State Courts Should Emphasize State History and Context
To give state constitutional language its intended meaning, state courts
must utilize state constitutional history and context when interpreting state
constitutional provisions. Analyzing the historical context and the intentions
of the framers of the state constitutions is the only way to give state
constitutional language its true meaning and effect. When judges interpret
the U.S. Constitution, they often look to the historical context and the
Framers’ intentions.245 They use records from the Constitutional Convention
and The Federalist Papers to interpret the federal constitutional language
because the document is a product of the late eighteenth century.246 Yet,
when state judges interpret state constitutions, there is rarely any discussion

244. Brennan Jr., supra note 210, at 946.
245. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 453, 459 (2013) (defining the common constitutional interpretation method of
originalism).
246. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 28.
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of the drafters’ intentions or the historical context in which the language was
adopted.247
Using interpretive methods that take into account the state-specific context
of the constitutional language is especially important for state constitutions
because state constitutions are easier to amend and more specific than the
U.S. Constitution.248 Therefore, while most of the federal constitutional text
embodies the ideas of one generation at a specific point in American history,
many state constitutions reflect the intentions of various generations.249 For
example, many state constitutions contain language that directly addresses
the prominent problem of government debt that arose in the mid-nineteenth
century after states overspent on infrastructure in response to the Industrial
Revolution.250 These provisions should be interpreted differently than the
provisions adopted by some states a century later, in response to the Great
Depression, that provide for “aid, care and support of the needy.”251
State courts that use the “criteria method” should pay particular attention
to the state-specific context of their constitutional language. The criteria
approach automatically frames federal precedent as presumptively correct.252
Although the criteria method often explicitly contemplates “constitutional
history” and “matters of particular state or local concern,”253 the presumptive
correctness of federal precedent remains problematic. The U.S. Supreme
Court’s holdings surely deserve respect, especially when they provide
insights into the origins of federal constitutional language. However, the
U.S. Supreme Court should not be presumed correct when its ruling is based
“only [on] a contemporary ‘balance’ of pragmatic considerations about
which reasonable people may differ over time and among the several
states.”254
This focus on state-specific interpretive methods is applicable even when
the federal and state constitutional language is identical. State-specific
concerns can result in different interpretations of constitutional formulations,
such as “reasonableness,” fairness, or directness in the context of
prosecutorial summation rules.255 State supreme court judges’ views of these
amorphous constitutional concepts within their own states’ social and
political contexts are just as valid as those of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices
in the context of the federal government.256
The “‘balance’ of pragmatic considerations about which reasonable people
may differ”257 is especially prominent in the prosecutorial summation
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See Liu, supra note 137, at 1328.
GARDNER, supra note 4, at 26–27.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
See supra notes 144–51 and accompanying text.
State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Or. 1983).
See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 170.
Id.
Kennedy, 666 P.2d at 1321.
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context. The rules of prosecutorial summations often involve weighing the
protections of the accused against the need for the prosecutor to argue and
inquire about aspects of the defendant’s case.258 The balance that must be
struck between both parties should involve a state-specific analysis because
the vague constitutional constructs at the core of criminal trial procedure may
be interpreted differently based on reasonable interpretations of
constitutional language and constitutional contexts. This is especially true
since the Supreme Court often calls on state courts to afford different rights
to their citizens on state law grounds with respect to criminal trial
procedure.259 State court judges should use state-specific constitutional
interpretation methods to give each state’s constitution its full intended
meaning, especially when analyzing prosecutorial summation issues.
B. State Court Legitimacy Through Broad Inherent Authority
“[S]tate governments possess all inherent power necessary to govern.”260
This is especially true in the prosecutorial summation context, where state
courts have the authority to promulgate rules of procedure, evidence, and
substance.261 This authority should not be wasted by simply adhering to
Supreme Court precedent. It should be used broadly to achieve the interests
of justice in accordance with the needs and customs of a specific
jurisdiction.262
Legitimacy is an urgent concern for state judges, especially since many
face reelection.263 It is true that the media and academia focus on and glorify
the federal judiciary, while underrepresenting the state judiciary and
emphasizing its shortcomings.264 However, if the state judiciary continues
to derive its legitimacy by relying on the federal judiciary, it will never gain
the legitimacy it legally possesses in its own right.265 State judges’ reliance
on federal precedent further reinforces the supremacy of the federal judiciary
in the eyes of the public. State court judges who rely on federal court
precedent reinforce the idea that the federal courts somehow control state
court analysis and reasoning. This is simply not the case in the realm of state
constitutional jurisprudence, especially for rulings related to prosecutorial
summation issues.
Even if state courts feel compelled to rely on other precedent or
interpretation to bolster their own reasoning, it would make more sense for
them to rely on sister state court cases than federal precedent.266 Sister state
courts will have similar exposure to prosecutorial summation issues and are
258. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506–07 (1983).
259. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 181; see also Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 76
(2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
260. MARKS & COOPER, supra note 6, at 1.
261. See Gershman, supra note 212, at 57–59.
262. See id. at 44.
263. See MARKS & COOPER, supra note 6, at 180–81.
264. Aldisert, supra note 5, at 559.
265. See MARKS & COOPER, supra note 6, at 1.
266. See SUTTON, supra note 10, at 175.
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more likely to share linguistic and historical roots than the U.S.
Constitution.267 Additionally, these state courts consider a similar
geographic area, as opposed to the Supreme Court, which considers
constitutional interpretation on a national level.268 This interstate reliance on
sister state courts would also bolster state court legitimacy, since relying on
each other’s authority would reinforce the integrity and validity of the state
judiciary as a whole.
State court judges specifically have the power to create local rules and
practice guides prioritizing or informing the legal community about state law
claims.269 The Oregon State Bar has already promulgated a state
constitutional law practice guide that two state court judges and three
practitioners wrote.270 Similar initiatives can help members of the bar realize
the independent role state constitutional law can play in representing their
clients.271 This prioritization could help to create a more robust state
constitutional law jurisprudence, which would help the state judiciary garner
more attention in academia and the media, thus bolstering its legitimacy in
the eyes of the public.
The structure of the American federalist system was specifically designed
so that state courts may enjoy some degree of independence from the federal
judiciary.272 Although there is some debate as to whether states should be
seen as independent “laborator[ies]”273 or as “part of the same general
research institution,”274 the concept of some level of independence is
maintained. The Framers would not have made such an effort to delineate
the powers of the state and federal governments if they were not meant to be
separate institutions. The foundational organization of the American
judiciary reinforces state courts’ legitimacy through their inherent authority.
C. State Court Exposure to Prosecutorial Summations
Prosecutorial summation speeches are overwhelmingly an aspect of
criminal trial procedure specific to state trial courts.275 Yet, it is evident from
state court language that state judges presume the Supreme Court Justices are
more authoritative on constitutional interpretation regarding prosecutorial
summation issues than state court judges are.276 Although the Supreme
Court’s main focus is constitutional jurisprudence,277 state courts are better
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See id. at 192 (explaining that state court judges, state legislatures, advocates, clerks’
offices, and professors create state rules of civil and appellate procedure).
270. See id. at 193.
271. Id.
272. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
273. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
274. Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV.
323, 343 (2011).
275. Latzer, supra note 225, at 123–24.
276. See supra Part I.B.
277. See Aldisert, supra note 5, at 560.
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equipped to interpret their constitutional language in the context of
prosecutorial summation issues.
Based on the sheer volume of criminal cases, the state courts are better
equipped to evaluate the various considerations at play in prosecutorial
summation issues. The state courts handle approximately 97 percent of all
felony cases and approximately 99 percent of all misdemeanor cases.278 This
means that state court judges are significantly more exposed to the effects of
their rulings and the policies that they impose. This exposure makes for more
informed policy that is tailored to a jurisdiction’s specific needs based on
state court judges’ everyday experience in the courtroom. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court Justices may have more experience in interpreting openended constitutional language such as “reasonableness,” state courts have
more experience with the actual procedure in which the interpretation of
constitutional language concerning prosecutorial summation issues must be
grounded.279 When state judges blindly apply federal precedent to state law
prosecutorial summation issues, they are eschewing the wealth of knowledge
amassed through their extensive criminal trial procedure experience.
Furthermore, the underlying reasoning behind federal court precedent may
be totally at odds with the various policy considerations at play in state court
prosecutorial summation issues.
The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the superiority of state court
experience with criminal trial procedure in the past by quoting state court
cases in justifying its own constitutional interpretations.280 The Supreme
Court has also changed its own ruling when an accumulation of state court
constitutional interpretations departed from the federal precedent.281 This
shows that state court judges should view the interaction between the state
and federal judiciaries as a dialogue instead of a monologue of marching
orders that the U.S. Supreme Court dictates to the states.282 This dialogue is
especially important in the prosecutorial summation context where state
courts have more exposure to the subject matter than federal courts.
Silencing this dialogue is detrimental to the development of both state and
federal constitutional interpretation.
D. The Need for State-Specific Criminal Trial Procedure
Judicial efficiency through legal uniformity is an important consideration
in the criminal procedure context for many judges in the American
judiciary.283 However, federal-state uniformity should not be an influential
factor in the prosecutorial summation context for several reasons.
278. Latzer, supra note 225, at 123–24.
279. On the Supreme Court, as of November 2020, only Justice Alito and Justice
Sotomayor have any experience as trial court lawyers, both having served as prosecutors for
a handful of years. Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/KFE9-N6PF] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
280. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 813–14 (1975).
281. See Liu, supra note 137, at 1332.
282. See id. at 1333.
283. Id.
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First, prosecutors are only required to adhere to the rules of the jurisdiction
to which they are assigned to practice.284 Thus, the idea that disuniformity
would create inefficiencies between federal and state authorities does not
apply to the prosecutorial summation context.285 A prosecutor will be
appearing in either state or federal court, never both. This gives state courts
all the more license to tailor prosecutorial summation rules specifically to
their particular jurisdictions’ needs and culture because prosecutors will not
be concerned about other jurisdictions’ rules in their everyday practices.
There will be no confusion about which rules apply to federal and state law
enforcement officers, as may be the case in other areas of criminal trial
procedure.286
Second, although there is some question about the extent to which states
have different cultures and concerns in an era of emphasis on national
citizenship and culture,287 there is a need for particularized criminal trial
procedure based on the unique customs and challenges that apply to certain
states and jurisdictions. The unique cultural aspects of liberal states like
Alaska or conservative states like Georgia should have judiciaries that
interpret their state constitutions in the context of those cultures.288
Liberal versus conservative considerations are not the only distinctions to
be made among state cultures. Hawaii’s multiethnic heritage,289 Louisiana’s
constitutional patriarchy,290 and Wyoming’s communitarian ideals291 all
should influence the way state court judges analyze and construct different
prosecutorial summation rules. Although not all states will have such starkly
differing cultures, at the very least, different regions of the country have
different historical foundations, requiring state courts to prioritize specialized
rules over uniformity. To ignore the cultural ethos of a state in the context
of prosecutorial summation issues is to ignore the differing values and
historical foundations that shaped the creation of each state’s constitution.
Unlike other areas of criminal procedure that may involve the interaction
between federal and state officials, there is no such justification in the
prosecutorial summation context.
CONCLUSION
State courts should refrain from allowing the Supreme Court to loom large
in prosecutorial summation jurisprudence when state courts are better
equipped to make decisions on these issues. State court judges should utilize
state-specific constitutional interpretation methods when interpreting state
284. See Newman F. Baker & Earl H. De Long, The Prosecuting Attorney—Powers and
Duties in Criminal Prosecution, 24 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1025, 1027 (1934).
285. See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (N.J. 1982) (arguing for uniform rules in the
criminal procedure context).
286. Liu, supra note 137, at 1333–34.
287. See id. at 1327.
288. See supra Part II.B.4.
289. MCHUGH, supra note 239, at 107–34.
290. Id. at 135–60.
291. Id. at 221–48.
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constitutions, instead of relying on constitutional interpretation methods that
begin by presuming federal constitutional interpretations are applicable and
correct. State courts possess the inherent authority to rule independently on
state criminal trial procedure and needlessly relying on federal precedent
only undermines their legitimacy.
Logistically, state courts have
significantly more exposure to criminal trial procedure because they handle
the vast majority of criminal cases. Although convergence and uniformity
between federal and state rules may be justified for other criminal trial
procedure topics, here, in the context of prosecutorial summations, there is
no reason for state courts to adhere to federal precedent. U.S. Supreme Court
precedent can be used as instructive reasoning for state court judges, but its
influence should not be heightened any further.

